The use and understanding of the term ‘virtue-signalling’ as some sort of term of abuse appears to be so confused that I thought I would analyse the different uses I found in the media and social media on 17.4.2022, particularly - although by no means exclusively - in relation to the Archbishop of Canterbury’s denunciation of the current U.K. Government’s plan to deport some refugees to Rwanda in his Easter Day sermon. The list of different types of use is not meant to be exhaustive: it is simply intended to start a thoughtful conversation. I will then consider in which types of case, if any, ‘virtue-signalling’ is an accurate term, and, even if it is, whether it is necessarily a bad thing. The discussion will also involve some thoughts on ‘vice-signalling’ .
1) Used pejoratively to criticize people for pretending to be virtuous without actually being virtuous; in most instances it is unclear whether the critic thinks the accused is trying to be virtuous but failing, or not even trying to be virtuous at all. But in both cases the charge seems to be one of deception and hypocrisy, though presumably more severe in the latter case.
2) Used pejoratively to criticize people for publicly flagging up their virtuous speech or actions. Here the charge seems to be one of vanity.
3) Used pejoratively of people simply discussing virtue. In these cases the charge often seems to be that simply discussing virtue is a way of drawing attention to one’s own virtue in caring about virtue - so perhaps a charge of vanity again. But in a few cases it appears that the critic does not like the conception of virtue in play - that they believe that different cultural groups have different conceptions of virtue and vice. In a few cases they appear to reject the language of virtue and vice in its entirety and find all such uses cynical covers for self-interest.
4) I also saw some puzzling references yesterday to ‘faux virtue-signalling’. Given that in each case the writer made it clear that they thought virtue-signalling was a bad thing, one might suppose that they would be pleased by false, or perhaps failed, virtue-signalling. But no. As far as I can work out, it seems to indicate those who are trying to conceal a really bad action under the cover of pretending to signal virtue (which of course the writer still thinks would be bad in itself) i.e. perhaps a particularly egregious case of 1), though I would be interested to hear how others think it is being used.
What of the accuracy of such uses of the term ‘virtue-signalling’? In many cases all four appeared to be used to try to dismiss and denigrate genuine and honest attempts to do or say something virtuous, or a genuine and honest attempt to discuss the nature of virtue - in other words, cases in which the ‘signalling’ of virtue was not the main motive. And of course in some instances it is simply impossible to perform the virtuous act without it being visible or audible - wearing a mask in public places, for example, to protect others from infection. In the case of the Archbishop of Canterbury, discussing the nature of virtue as conceived in Christianity is something he is supposed to do from his pulpit - it is a key part of his job. And considering which acts do, and which acts do not, meet the criteria will illuminate such discussion.
What of those who choose to display the Ukrainian flag, for example, on their social media posts? Again, the whole point of the act is that it has to be visible. You can wave a Ukrainian flag in the privacy of your bedroom, and perhaps that would at least boost your own resolve, but if you want to express public solidarity with Ukrainians, and you hope give a tiny bit of comfort to them in so doing, you have to make a public sign.
But suppose you also want people to think of you as a good, caring person? Suppose your motives for displaying the Ukrainian flag are mixed and some ego is involved as well as genuine care? It is of course very hard to know in particular cases when some ego is also at play - it may even be hard for the agent themselves to understand all their motives. But let’s imagine a case where the agent is motivated by both genuine care for others and a bit of vanity. As we have seen, we can’t stipulate simply that all virtuous acts be performed in private: some have to be public. But what of those cases where the act - say, giving to a refugee charity - could be performed anonymously, but the donor chooses to make their gift public, and in so doing is motivated by both genuine compassion and generosity, and also by a bit of ego. In such cases would it not always be better to give anonymously?
The answer is not straightforward. It might perhaps be better in terms of the purity of their character, but not necessarily better in terms of the benefit to society, as publicly visible and audible virtuous acts can inspire others, and publicly visible and audible virtuous people - even if their virtue is compromised by some vanity (I appreciate that this means they would not count as properly virtuous in some philosophies, such as Stoicism) - can act as role models to be emulated. In ancient Greece - in Homer, for instance - it was thought to be a good thing to be competitive about virtue. And as noted we can’t even say for sure that ego is involved in a particular case: a celebrity, for instance, might be acting purely out of compassionate motives, and might actually prefer to give anonymously, but nevertheless choose to make their donation public to encourage others, even though they are fully aware that criticism will be heaped upon them for using their platform in this way.
Such complexities refer to those who are indeed doing something virtuous ( Stoic and other caveats notwithstanding). What of those who are signalling virtue they have not yet fully achieved, or even barely begun to achieve? Are they simply deceitful hypocrites? In these cases we need to look at the exact nature of the claim in each case. Are they claiming a virtue they do not have, and are they intending to deceive people into thinking that they do in fact possess it? This seems to me the only case in which ‘virtue-signalling’ usually does more harm than good, though even here at least virtue is being held up as something praiseworthy. But it is repellent: an example might be clapping to support the NHS and other care workers while failing to provide them with adequate PPE when it is in your power so to supply them. However, more frequent are the cases where the person is not claiming their possession of the virtue, but claiming their love of it and aspiration towards it. This kind of moral ambition seems to me to be a good thing, though I agree that the agent does need to take care in articulating precisely what they are claiming if they are to be excused charges of deceit and hypocrisy.
In my view the most troubling instances of attack on ‘virtue-signalling’ are those where the critics are attacking the very notion of virtue in play (3), and perhaps trying to supplant the despised virtue-signalling with a ‘vice-signalling’ that they present as admirable. In these cases, the at least implied claim seems to be that there are different political and cultural conceptions of ‘virtue’ and ‘vice’, and that the person attacking the supposed ‘virtue-signalling’ is in fact simply attacking the conception of virtue of perceived political and cultural opponents. And in trying to replace it with an act of ‘vice-signalling’, they mean an act that would be perceived as vicious by the same perceived political and cultural opponents. In such cases the principal aim is not to further the good of society as a whole, or even - perhaps surprisingly - to further what you take to be the good of your own political and cultural group, but to exacerbate the perceived divisions and to annoy, anger, dismay or damage the perceived opponents. In other words, the so-called ‘sado-populism’ dear to Bannon, Trump and many others.
My guess is that it is sado-populist vice-signalling that we are witnessing in the Government’s plan to deport refugees to Rwanda. My guess is that the plan will not withstand the legal challenges that will come its way and my guess, too, is that Johnson at least does not much care (I am not so sure about Patel): I think that the two main intentions of announcing the plan were to move the conversation on from parties and lies about parties, and to increase divisions and delight some core supporters ahead of the May 5th local elections in the U.K..
A very dangerous consequence of these general attacks on talk of ‘virtue’, and boasts of ‘vice’, is that all talk of virtue and vice quickly ends up being cynically dismissed as a cover for self-interest - we would be heading for a world pretty close to that described by Thrasymachus in Book 1 of Plato’s Republic.
To sum up: acts that are sneeringly and lazily dismissed as ‘virtue-signalling’ are usually - though not always - forces for good, albeit in complex ways. Acts boastfully proclaimed as ‘vice-signalling’ are, as far as I have been able to tell so far, pretty much always divisive and malign in intent.