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Some Thoughts on Virtue-Signalling

The use and understanding of the term ‘virtue-signalling’ as some sort of term of abuse appears to be so confused that I thought I would analyse the different uses I found in the media and social media on 17.4.2022, particularly - although by no means exclusively - in relation to the Archbishop of Canterbury’s denunciation of the current U.K. Government’s plan to deport some refugees to Rwanda in his Easter Day sermon. The list of different types of use is not meant to be exhaustive: it is simply intended to start a thoughtful conversation. I will then consider in which types of case, if any, ‘virtue-signalling’ is an accurate term, and, even if it is, whether it is necessarily a bad thing. The discussion will also involve some thoughts on ‘vice-signalling’ .

1) Used pejoratively to criticize people for pretending to be virtuous without actually being virtuous; in most instances it is unclear whether the critic thinks the accused is trying to be virtuous but failing, or not even trying to be virtuous at all. But in both cases the charge seems to be one of deception and hypocrisy, though presumably more severe in the latter case.

2) Used pejoratively to criticize people for publicly flagging up their virtuous speech or actions. Here the charge seems to be one of vanity.

3) Used pejoratively of people simply discussing virtue. In these cases the charge often seems to be that simply discussing virtue is a way of drawing attention to one’s own virtue in caring about virtue - so perhaps a charge of vanity again. But in a few cases it appears that the critic does not like the conception of virtue in play - that they believe that different cultural groups have different conceptions of virtue and vice. In a few cases they appear to reject the language of virtue and vice in its entirety and find all such uses cynical covers for self-interest.

4) I also saw some puzzling references yesterday to ‘faux virtue-signalling’. Given that in each case the writer made it clear that they thought virtue-signalling was a bad thing, one might suppose that they would be pleased by false, or perhaps failed, virtue-signalling. But no. As far as I can work out, it seems to indicate those who are trying to conceal a really bad action under the cover of pretending to signal virtue (which of course the writer still thinks would be bad in itself) i.e. perhaps a particularly egregious case of 1), though I would be interested to hear how others think it is being used.

What of the accuracy of such uses of the term ‘virtue-signalling’? In many cases all four appeared to be used to try to dismiss and denigrate genuine and honest attempts to do or say something virtuous, or a genuine and honest attempt to discuss the nature of virtue - in other words, cases in which the ‘signalling’ of virtue was not the main motive. And of course in some instances it is simply impossible to perform the virtuous act without it being visible or audible - wearing a mask in public places, for example, to protect others from infection. In the case of the Archbishop of Canterbury, discussing the nature of virtue as conceived in Christianity is something he is supposed to do from his pulpit - it is a key part of his job. And considering which acts do, and which acts do not, meet the criteria will illuminate such discussion.

What of those who choose to display the Ukrainian flag, for example, on their social media posts? Again, the whole point of the act is that it has to be visible. You can wave a Ukrainian flag in the privacy of your bedroom, and perhaps that would at least boost your own resolve, but if you want to express public solidarity with Ukrainians, and you hope give a tiny bit of comfort to them in so doing, you have to make a public sign.

But suppose you also want people to think of you as a good, caring person? Suppose your motives for displaying the Ukrainian flag are mixed and some ego is involved as well as genuine care? It is of course very hard to know in particular cases when some ego is also at play - it may even be hard for the agent themselves to understand all their motives. But let’s imagine a case where the agent is motivated by both genuine care for others and a bit of vanity. As we have seen, we can’t stipulate simply that all virtuous acts be performed in private: some have to be public. But what of those cases where the act - say, giving to a refugee charity - could be performed anonymously, but the donor chooses to make their gift public, and in so doing is motivated by both genuine compassion and generosity, and also by a bit of ego. In such cases would it not always be better to give anonymously?

The answer is not straightforward. It might perhaps be better in terms of the purity of their character, but not necessarily better in terms of the benefit to society, as publicly visible and audible virtuous acts can inspire others, and publicly visible and audible virtuous people - even if their virtue is compromised by some vanity (I appreciate that this means they would not count as properly virtuous in some philosophies, such as Stoicism) - can act as role models to be emulated. In ancient Greece - in Homer, for instance - it was thought to be a good thing to be competitive about virtue. And as noted we can’t even say for sure that ego is involved in a particular case: a celebrity, for instance, might be acting purely out of compassionate motives, and might actually prefer to give anonymously, but nevertheless choose to make their donation public to encourage others, even though they are fully aware that criticism will be heaped upon them for using their platform in this way.

Such complexities refer to those who are indeed doing something virtuous ( Stoic and other caveats notwithstanding). What of those who are signalling virtue they have not yet fully achieved, or even barely begun to achieve? Are they simply deceitful hypocrites? In these cases we need to look at the exact nature of the claim in each case. Are they claiming a virtue they do not have, and are they intending to deceive people into thinking that they do in fact possess it? This seems to me the only case in which ‘virtue-signalling’ usually does more harm than good, though even here at least virtue is being held up as something praiseworthy. But it is repellent: an example might be clapping to support the NHS and other care workers while failing to provide them with adequate PPE when it is in your power so to supply them. However, more frequent are the cases where the person is not claiming their possession of the virtue, but claiming their love of it and aspiration towards it. This kind of moral ambition seems to me to be a good thing, though I agree that the agent does need to take care in articulating precisely what they are claiming if they are to be excused charges of deceit and hypocrisy.

In my view the most troubling instances of attack on ‘virtue-signalling’ are those where the critics are attacking the very notion of virtue in play (3), and perhaps trying to supplant the despised virtue-signalling with a ‘vice-signalling’ that they present as admirable. In these cases, the at least implied claim seems to be that there are different political and cultural conceptions of ‘virtue’ and ‘vice’, and that the person attacking the supposed ‘virtue-signalling’ is in fact simply attacking the conception of virtue of perceived political and cultural opponents. And in trying to replace it with an act of ‘vice-signalling’, they mean an act that would be perceived as vicious by the same perceived political and cultural opponents. In such cases the principal aim is not to further the good of society as a whole, or even - perhaps surprisingly - to further what you take to be the good of your own political and cultural group, but to exacerbate the perceived divisions and to annoy, anger, dismay or damage the perceived opponents. In other words, the so-called ‘sado-populism’ dear to Bannon, Trump and many others.

My guess is that it is sado-populist vice-signalling that we are witnessing in the Government’s plan to deport refugees to Rwanda. My guess is that the plan will not withstand the legal challenges that will come its way and my guess, too, is that Johnson at least does not much care (I am not so sure about Patel): I think that the two main intentions of announcing the plan were to move the conversation on from parties and lies about parties, and to increase divisions and delight some core supporters ahead of the May 5th local elections in the U.K..

A very dangerous consequence of these general attacks on talk of ‘virtue’, and boasts of ‘vice’, is that all talk of virtue and vice quickly ends up being cynically dismissed as a cover for self-interest - we would be heading for a world pretty close to that described by Thrasymachus in Book 1 of Plato’s Republic.

To sum up: acts that are sneeringly and lazily dismissed as ‘virtue-signalling’ are usually - though not always - forces for good, albeit in complex ways. Acts boastfully proclaimed as ‘vice-signalling’ are, as far as I have been able to tell so far, pretty much always divisive and malign in intent.

Trump, Plato and Tyranny

When Trump was elected in November 2016 the first text I turned to was Plato’s coruscating analysis in the Republic 8 and 9 (562a-576b) of how a democracy can be subverted to tyranny by an opportunistic demagogue, rule by the people swiftly degenerating into authoritarian leading of the people.  Have Trump’s words and actions since, particularly in the last few weeks, shown my fears to be justified?

Plato was, admittedly, no great fan of direct democracy (he had no experience of the representative kind), but he did think it greatly preferable to tyranny.  And he knew about tyrants.  On his first visit to Sicily in 387 BCE he had stayed at the court of the tyrant Dionysius I in Syracuse.  The visit did not end well – according to some versions of the story Plato narrowly escaped being sold into slavery after castigating Dionysius for his tyranny.  Earlier, in 404-3, he had been revolted by the brutal actions of the Thirty Tyrants in Athens, an oligarchic regime set up by Sparta after it had defeated Athens in the Peloponnesian War.

In the Republic, we learn that the demagogue gains power by democratic means, claiming to be a champion of the people and making wild promises (‘Freedom!’).  Anyone who opposes him is labelled ‘an enemy of the people’ and exiled, imprisoned or killed.  Such tactics naturally provoke genuine opposition and the demagogue grows increasingly suspicious of those around him, retreating into his palace-fortress and in the grip of his obsessions.  He does not trust the state to protect him and acquires his own bodyguard and eventually a private army.

The parallels with Trump are not, of course, exact, but they are still highly disturbing.  Trump has not yet created a private army, although significant numbers of the militias seen patrolling Washington D.C. recently were unidentified by name badges or unit insignia – and hence very hard to hold to account.  And in one especially troubling aspect Trump has surpassed the excesses even of Plato’s deranged prototype.  In Plato, the demagogue accuses certain individuals of being ‘enemies of the people’; Trump has accused whole sectors, such as the ‘liberal’ media, and all the doctors, judges, lawyers, regular military and academics who speak out – who disagree, for instance, that drinking bleach can help protect against or cure COVID-19, or who object to tear gas being used on peaceful protesters to clear a path for Trump to stand in front of a church holding up a bible.

And it is not even just sectors that Trump targets.  Plato’s demagogue concentrates on stirring up external conflicts, to keep his people fearful and in need of a strong leader.  Trump increasingly seems bent on appealing to his most ardent supporters by acting as if he is at war with millions of his own people.

For Plato, the critical turning-point comes when the first blood is spilled on home territory.  Then, says Plato, ‘the man becomes a wolf’ and the full tyrant is born.  Trump’s inflammatory and divisive words and actions have now exacerbated a long-standing problem in parts of the police to the point where a white officer felt emboldened to kneel on a black man’s neck for over 8 minutes, crushing the life out of him.

We have been warned.  Will we listen?

The Rise of the Demagogue - A Warning from Plato

The Rise of the Demagogue – A Warning from Plato

 

Global capitalism has not worked for everyone, and the growing populist movements around the world are partly an expression of justifiable frustration at the inequitable distribution of economic opportunities and rewards.  However, some unscrupulous populist leaders have cynically directed that frustration and anger onto the wrong targets: particular racial and religious groups; women; even the disabled have been mocked.  These populists have claimed that only they understand and champion ‘the people’; all those who challenge them are ‘enemies of the people’ – by implication not really people at all.  Nothing should block the direct implementation of ‘the people’s will’, and if democratic institutions - Parliament, say, or Congress, or an independent judiciary or free press – present obstacles to the immediate implementation of this will, then they are enemies too.

The kind of liberal representative democracy that emerged in the 17th and 18th centuries is founded on notions of equal civic rights (themselves often founded on ideas of universal human rights) and supported by the rule of law and freedom of expression.  Some of the populists’ rhetoric and other actions (because speech acts are acts) have already done serious damage to these foundations and supports, and unleashed and emboldened some toxic views amongst the most extreme of their followers.  It is not too late to protect liberal democracy, but those of us who care about it are going to have to work hard in 2017 and beyond.  We need to disentangle the complicated web of understandable economic grievances from the yearning amongst some for white supremacy (particularly white male supremacy) and address the former while heeding but not in any way indulging the latter. We must use every peaceful means of civic protest to call out – clearly, firmly and swiftly – every single infringement of civic and human rights and every attack on the rule of law.  We must resist the normalisation of profoundly immoral speech and behaviour.  Such resistance is not ‘unpatriotic’, still less ‘treasonable’: if our accusers are British or American we can remind them that we are fighting to save a liberal democracy forged, in part, by the British philosopher John Locke and the British-American Thomas Paine. 

Plato provides a salutary warning. Although he was no fan of the (direct rather than representative) democracy that he witnessed in fourth century Athens, he did think democracy was a great deal better than tyranny, and in Republic 8 (562b-569c) he provides a chilling account of how democracy can be subverted into tyranny by an opportunistic demagogue, rule by the people swiftly degenerating into manipulative leading of the people.  The demagogue gains power by democratic means, claiming to be a champion of ‘the people’ and making wild promises; in particular he offers intoxicating quantities of the neat spirit of independence.  Anyone who opposes the demagogue is labelled an ‘enemy of the people’ and exiled or killed. Such tactics naturally create genuine enemies, and the demagogue quickly acquires a large bodyguard, and eventually a private army.  External conflicts are also stirred up to keep the people in need of a strong leader.  It is also in the demagogue’s interests to keep his supporters poor as well as fearful, and when they start to rebel, protesting that this is not why they voted him in, he attacks them too and the full-blooded tyrant is born.

Plato’s demagogues peddle fantasy and utterly disregard the facts. Of course individual purported ‘facts’ can and should be questioned, but if we have contempt for the very notions of truth and fact, if we acquiesce in the current fashion for ‘post-fact’, then it will not just be the future of liberal democracy at stake, but ultimately the survival of all life on our planet.  Fortunately, we are still at the crossroads.  We can still choose which road to take.

 

Stoic Ethics - some Pros and Cons

For the second year philosophers from the University of Exeter and Birkbeck, University of London, together with psychotherapists, are calling on people to live like a Stoic this week: http://blogs.exeter.ac.uk/stoicismtoday/  @StoicWeek  People from all around the world are taking part (over 18,00 so far) and you can still sign up until midnight Monday 25th November.  The experiment will culminate in a workshop this Saturday 30th November at Birkbeck exploring Stoicism for Everyday Life.  This is an extremely interesting and potentially very valuable project, conceived and led by respected academics, such as Professor Christopher Gill at Exeter and Dr John Sellars from Birkbeck, and I shall study the results with care and, I hope, an open mind.  It is a Good Thing that this experiment is happening.  For reasons I outline below, I doubt if many, if any, people will succeed in living up to the Stoic ideal in its entirety but - as I also touch on below - I think this is for the best.  Although ancient Stoics would disapprove, arguing that their ethics forms a coherent whole based on the foundations of their metaphysics and held together by their logic, I think it is best to cherry-pick Stoicism today and adapt a few of its values and precepts to contemporary conditions.  In my view their ethical system in its purest form contains real dangers.

Professor Christopher Gill and I had a brief discussion of the project and some of the pros and cons of Stoic ethics on BBC Radio 4's Today programme this morning: http://t.co/nfKr3edEZQ (item starts at 2.28), but time was, inevitably, at a premium.  So I am listing here a few of my concerns and questions about the Stoic ethical system - while also acknowledging some of its benefits.  And let me say again: these concerns do not mean that I am questioning the value of the 'Live Like a Stoic Week' experiment itself.

1) I remain unconvinced by the view that, if only we humans could see the full picture, we would realise that even those events that appear to us now to be bad are actually for the best, that they are either in fact good in themselves or a necessary by-product of a grand design that is good in itself.  While I agree that in some cases it is both accurate and therapeutic to change our view of something, I certainly do not think this is  always the case: I find it distasteful to view the recent catastrophic events in the Philippines, for example, as part of a good overall design.  This approach could also lead people to adopt an attitude of unhealthy political passivity; whereas it seems to me that some things (maybe not events such as those in the Philippines, but others of human agency), can and should be resisted and changed.  Professor Gill made the point in the Today debate that many ancient Stoics did take part in political life, and this is true, particularly of Roman Stoics; nevertheless, I still think the dangers of excessive passivity are inherent in the system.

2)  I have similar views about the Stoic goal of extirpating the passions.  The four main passions, they hold, are desire (a subdivision of which is anger), fear, pleasure (as in a conscious evaluative attitude, not the non-evaluative sensation, which is classed as an  'indifferent') and distress.  These passions are, in effect, false value judgements of an object's worth.  This does not mean that the Stoic should seek to be without all feelings (correct affective states are allowed and, despite the stereotype, Stoics can be warm, affectionate and generous).  And of course you can say that if passions are actually to be defined as false judgements then, by definition, they are dangerous and you should seek to get rid of them.  But I still think this view of the passions is too sweeping.  I agree with Aristotle that in some circumstances anger, for instance, is the appropriate response (though, again, arguably not if you define anger, as the Stoics do, as the desire for revenge).

3) Seeing oneself as part of a community of rational beings has merit in that it can cut through barriers of class, race and gender.  But I still think it places too much weight on rationality.  What about non-rational beings such as (most) non-human animals and plants?  What about humans whose rationality is impaired by accident or illness or disability?

4)  It is an extremely tough and uncompromising ethic: you are either completely good or completely bad, no matter how far you are on the path towards goodness.  As the Stoics liked to put it, a man drowns just the same whether he's  deep under water or just below the surface.

5)  And, as I mentioned above, ancient Stoics might well protest at a project which concentrates on the more immediately palatable aspects of their ethical thinking, arguing that their ethics forms an integrated whole, based on their metaphysics and logic.

There is much more to be said on all these points, and some of the complexities are discussed by the ancient Stoics themselves.  Not all specialists in ancient philosophy will agree with my interpretations.  Stoicism is certainly a philosophy that repays careful study and none of my concerns detracts from the fact that some aspects of Stoic ethics are attractive and potentially therapeutic: in some instances it is indeed helpful to change our attitude towards things which we cannot change in themselves.  As the Stoicism Today literature points out, Stoic thought is an important influence on cognitive behavioural therapy, and this link is one of the main features that this week's experiment is designed to test.  Mindfulness, fortitude and self-discipline will usually benefit the agent.  Concentrating on the cultivation of virtue rather than wealth or status is refreshing and liberating.  But study other philosophies, including other ancient philosophies, too.

For the reasons above, I am not myself taking part in the project, though I am paying it the serious attention it deserves.  My plan is to try to live like an Epicurean this week as some kind of control - though Epicureanism is also tougher than it sounds ...